A solution to the discursive dilemma

Ruth Weintraub*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn't always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, I argue, shows that rational belief needn't be consistent. So the alleged implications of the dilemma are dispelled.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-188
Number of pages8
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume152
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2011

Keywords

  • Aggregation
  • Dilemma
  • Discursive
  • Rationality

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