TY - JOUR
T1 - A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics
AU - Grossman, Gene M.
AU - Helpman, Elhanan
N1 - Funding Information:
* We are grateful to Robert Barro, Avinash Dixit, Torsten Persson, Thomas Romer, Andrei Shleifer, and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions and to Itay Fainmesser and Mihai Manea for outstanding research assistance. We acknowledge with thanks the support of the National Science Foundation (SES 0211748) and the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation (2002132). Part of Helpman’s work was done when he was Sackler Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University.
PY - 2005/11
Y1 - 2005/11
N2 - We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.
AB - We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between "policy rhetoric" and "policy reality" and introduces an important role for "party discipline" in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=31444432705&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1162/003355305775097498
DO - 10.1162/003355305775097498
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.systematicreview???
AN - SCOPUS:31444432705
SN - 0033-5533
VL - 120
SP - 1239
EP - 1282
JO - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JF - Quarterly Journal of Economics
IS - 4
ER -