A problem for hume's theory of induction

Ruth Weintraub*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

According to Hume, the paradigm type of inductive reasoning involves a constant conjunction. But, as Price points out, Hume misrepresents ordinary induction: we experience very few constant conjunctions. In this paper, I examine several ways of defending Hume's (psychological) account of our practice against Price's objection, and conclude that the theory cannot be upheld.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-187
Number of pages19
JournalHume Studies
Volume34
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2008

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A problem for hume's theory of induction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this