A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science and its implications for replication

Many philosophers of science and methodologists have argued that the ability to repeat studies and obtain similar results is an
essential component of science. A finding is elevated from single observation to scientific evidence when the procedures that were used to
obtain it can be reproduced and the finding itself can be replicated. Recent replication attempts show that some high profile results – most
notably in psychology, but in many other disciplines as well – cannot be replicated consistently. These replication attempts have generated
a considerable amount of controversy, and the issue of whether direct replications have value has, in particular, proven to be contentious.
However, much of this discussion has occurred in published commentaries and social media outlets, resulting in a fragmented discourse.
To address the need for an integrative summary, we review various types of replication studies and then discuss the most commonly
voiced concerns about direct replication. We provide detailed responses to these concerns and consider different statistical ways to
evaluate replications. We conclude there are no theoretical or statistical obstacles to making direct replication a routine aspect of
psychological science.