A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

Chaim Fershtman*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same "side" may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlements that they yield. In particular the note examines the possibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement. The different potential outcomes that are implied by the different procedures explain why we often observe such intense negotiation over bargaining procedures. Moreover, the conflict over procedure can be substantial, among parties with common interest as well as between opposing players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)216-227
Number of pages12
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume30
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2000

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