A note on k-price auctions with complete information

Yair Tauman

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00020-9

A note on k-price auctions with complete information

Yair Tauman

Coller School of Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Under complete information, for k ≥ 3, a seller of a single-unit k-price auction obtains higher revenue than in a first or second price auction when the valuations and the bids are discrete and no bidder is using a (weakly) dominated strategy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	161-164
Number of pages	4
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	41
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00020-9
State	Published - Oct 2002

Keywords

Third price auction

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10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00020-9

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A note on k-price auctions with complete information

Abstract

Keywords

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