Abstract
In this paper, I defend a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement, the question as to how you should respond when you learn that your ‘epistemic peer’ disagrees with you about some issue (tomorrow’s weather, the permissibility of abortion, the existence of universals). I consider four (familiar) test cases that together impugn every extant full-blown theory about peer disagreement. I present my own solution, show that it delivers the intuitive verdict in the test cases and address some objections.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 795-811 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Inquiry (United Kingdom) |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue number | 8 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 13 Sep 2020 |
Keywords
- Peer disagreement
- conciliationism
- justificationism
- total evidence view
