TY - CHAP
T1 - A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents
AU - Glazer, Jacob
AU - Rubinstein, Ariel
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.
AB - A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85153656428&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1142/9789813141339_0006
DO - 10.1142/9789813141339_0006
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AN - SCOPUS:85153656428
SP - 95
EP - 122
BT - Models Of Bounded Rationality And Mechanism Design
PB - World Scientific Publishing Co.
ER -