A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1057-1082
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume120
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2012

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this