A game-theoretic approach for cost allocation in joint ventures in electrical power generation systems

Nissan Levin, Jacob Zahavi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A game-theoretic approach involving the Aumann-Shapley (AS) prices is used for cost allocation in joint ventures in electrical power generation systems. Three basic cases are considered: the case of “similar” load duration curves (LDC's) for the participating utilities and economies of scale in the capital cost for the jointly-owned unit; the case of “unsimilar” LDC's, same peak hour and no economies of scale; and the case of “unsimilar” LDC's, same peak hour with economies of scale. In the first case, the benefits of cooperation result from economies of scale, in the second from savings in the fuel costs and in the third from both. In all cases, the theoretical development is followed by a detailed numerical example to demonstrate the calculation process of the AS prices and the benefits of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1121-1130
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems
VolumePAS-104
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1985

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