TY - JOUR
T1 - A double-ended queueing model for dynamic allocation of live organs based on a best-fit criterion
AU - Elalouf, Amir
AU - Perlman, Yael
AU - Yechiali, Uri
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2018/8
Y1 - 2018/8
N2 - We propose a novel approach, based on a Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) best-fit criterion, to dynamically allocate live organs (specifically, kidneys) to candidates needing transplantation. A ‘reward’ is assigned to each level of HLA fit, such that higher rewards are attributed to transplants between better-matched candidates and kidneys. We also envision future technologies by which it will be possible to store organs so that two queues may form: waiting candidates or stored kidneys. Consequently, a double-ended queue of candidates and kidneys is constructed, where the lifetime of a stored kidney is random, and candidates queueing for transplantation may die (‘renege’) while waiting. We derive expressions for the probability that a candidate gets a kidney before reneging; for the mean numbers of waiting candidates and of stored kidneys; and for a candidate's or kidney's mean sojourn time. Assuming a best-HLA-fit matching policy, we study three measures of effectiveness: (i) Rate of Reward from Transplantation (RRT); (ii) Expected Reward per Transplantation (ERT), calculated as RRT divided by the rate of performed transplantations, and (iii) Gained rate of reward per one dollar of expenditure. The optimal fraction of kidneys that should be stored so as to maximize the rate of reward per one dollar of expenditure is numerically determined.
AB - We propose a novel approach, based on a Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) best-fit criterion, to dynamically allocate live organs (specifically, kidneys) to candidates needing transplantation. A ‘reward’ is assigned to each level of HLA fit, such that higher rewards are attributed to transplants between better-matched candidates and kidneys. We also envision future technologies by which it will be possible to store organs so that two queues may form: waiting candidates or stored kidneys. Consequently, a double-ended queue of candidates and kidneys is constructed, where the lifetime of a stored kidney is random, and candidates queueing for transplantation may die (‘renege’) while waiting. We derive expressions for the probability that a candidate gets a kidney before reneging; for the mean numbers of waiting candidates and of stored kidneys; and for a candidate's or kidney's mean sojourn time. Assuming a best-HLA-fit matching policy, we study three measures of effectiveness: (i) Rate of Reward from Transplantation (RRT); (ii) Expected Reward per Transplantation (ERT), calculated as RRT divided by the rate of performed transplantations, and (iii) Gained rate of reward per one dollar of expenditure. The optimal fraction of kidneys that should be stored so as to maximize the rate of reward per one dollar of expenditure is numerically determined.
KW - Double-ended queue
KW - Dynamic organ allocation
KW - HLA best-fit
KW - Organ preservation
KW - Reneging
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044750792&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.apm.2018.03.022
DO - 10.1016/j.apm.2018.03.022
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AN - SCOPUS:85044750792
SN - 0307-904X
VL - 60
SP - 179
EP - 191
JO - Applied Mathematical Modelling
JF - Applied Mathematical Modelling
ER -