Abstract
A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature's strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs. As opposed to a utility function that is derived in another context, the utility matrix derived in the game will incorporate all psychological or sociological determinants of well-being that result from the very fact that the outcomes are obtained in a given game.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 172-182 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - Jul 2003 |