A cooperative location game based on the 1-center location problem

Justo Puerto*, Arie Tamir, Federico Perea

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is the service radius of the coalition. We call these games the Minimum Radius Location Games (MRLG). We study the existence of core allocations and the existence of polynomial representations of the cores of these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on the ℓp metric spaces defined over Rd.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)317-330
Number of pages14
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume214
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 16 Oct 2011

Funding

FundersFunder number
Junta de Andalucía
European Regional Development FundFQM-5849

    Keywords

    • Cooperative combinatorial games
    • Core solutions
    • Diameter
    • Radius

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