A condition guaranteeing that the Nash allocation is Walrasian

David Schmeidler*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider the set of net trades attainable by an economic agent when he varies his strategy and all other agents stick to their strategies. If all attainable sets for all agents are star shaped with respect to the origin, then every Pareto efficient Nash allocation is Walrasian. This result bears upon the question whether it is possible to implement redistributive goals without impairing efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)376-378
Number of pages3
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume28
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1982

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