A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity

Uzi Segal; Joel Sobel

doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0085-2

A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	571-585
Number of pages	15
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	36
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0085-2
State	Published - Mar 2008
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Extended preferences
Game theory
Reciprocity

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10.1007/s00182-007-0085-2

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title = "A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity",

abstract = "This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.",

keywords = "Extended preferences, Game theory, Reciprocity",

author = "Uzi Segal and Joel Sobel",

note = "Funding Information: Segal thanks SSHRCC and Sobel thanks the Guggenheim Foundation, NSF, and the Secretar{\'i}a de Estado de Universidades e Investigaci{\'o}n del Ministerio de Educaci{\'o}n y Ciencia (Spain) for financial support. Sobel is grateful to the Departament d{\textquoteright}Economia i d{\textquoteright}Hist{\`o}ria Econ{\`o}mica and Institut d{\textquoteright}An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica of the Universitat Aut{\`o}noma de Barcelona for hospitality and administrative support.",

year = "2008",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1007/s00182-007-0085-2",

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AU - Sobel, Joel

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PY - 2008/3

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N2 - This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.

AB - This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.

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KW - Game theory

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A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity

Abstract

Keywords

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