A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity

Uzi Segal, Joel Sobel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)571-585
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume36
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2008
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Extended preferences
  • Game theory
  • Reciprocity

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