ε-consistent equilibrium in repeated games

Ehud Lehrer, Sylvain Sorin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We introduce the concept of ε-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a ε-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an ε-consistent equilibrium induces an ́-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of ́-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-244
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1998

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